Sushan Bhattarai is an art historian and researcher specializing in the circulation of Himalayan art styles and the impact of climate change on highland heritage in Nepal. His current work focuses on documenting archaeological sites across the Central Himalayas, with a particular emphasis on those linked to the Khasa Malla Empire. He holds a B.A. in History and Environmental Studies from Amherst College.
Aakriti Suresh is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History, University of Bristol, UK. Her Ph.D. project sits at the intersection of environmental history, British empire, and South Asian Studies. She holds an M.Phil (University of Hyderabad, India) and an M.A in History (University of Delhi, India).
“I fear that if there are instances of violence here in Janakpur, it will have a ripple effect and will spread to Bihar,” said a local journalist who agreed to meet with us and discuss the rising strides of Hindu nationalism in the Madhesh Province of Nepal.
While researchers and analysts have extensively argued about India-led Hindu nationalism spreading to Nepal, this article seeks to explore the place Nepal holds in this project and how Hindu extremist activities in Nepal can be examined to de-centre Indian politics and explore if the Nepali Hindu nationalist narratives offer an alternate vision of building and accessing a Hindu Rashtra.
This article is based on interviews conducted by the authors in the town of Janakpur located in the Madhesh province of Nepal. The location and history of this town is particularly important for this piece as Janakpur, part of the Madhesh province of Nepal, is located at a mere distance of 14 kilometers from the India-Nepal border. Cross-border movements, shared languages and marital relations have long shaped the relationship between the people of Janakpur and various towns and villages in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Additionally, Janakpur is alive in the public memory of people as the capital of the ancient kingdom of Mithila, ruled by Raja Janak and the maternal home of Goddess Sita. According to the Ramcharitamanas, the famous Swayamwar of Lord Ram and Sita took place in Janakpur, a holy marriage that continues to be commemorated through the annual festival of Vivah Panchami.
An Indian newspaper on the counter of a shop in Janakpur, where the shopkeeper was interviewed. Photo courtesy of the authors.
First and foremost, this article does not aim at discrediting the role that India and Indian politics play in the surge of Hindu extremist activities in Nepal. Specifically in the province of Madhesh, geography and the fluidity of the border have played a crucial role in facilitating an easy import of Hindu extremist ideas from across the border into Madhesh. Given the proximity of the region to Bihar and the familial relations that exist between the people of ‘Mithilanchal,’ it should not come as a surprise that people in Janakpur are avid observers of Indian politics. A veteran journalist that we talked to confirmed that people in Madhesh are often up-to-date with Indian politics, and that “it is more likely that Madheshis would know the names of far-away districts in India, but would be unfamiliar with the regions and political developments within Nepal.” These observations prompted us to ask our other interviewees if they followed Indian media and the answer was a resounding confirmation. Aaj Tak, Zee News, India TV are popular amongst the people of Janakpur. Naturally, the misinformation disseminated by ‘Godi Media’ and the communal hatred fuelled by these channels has seeped into the social psyche of Janakpur. “Look at what Muslims are doing in France and in the UK. Wherever they go, they always create a ruckus. Their population is also increasing alarmingly,” commented a Hindu shopkeeper who owns a jewellery store in the neighbouring lanes of Janaki Temple in Janakpur. The impact and import of hateful vocabulary, as perpetuated by ‘Godi’ media, has also affected Muslim perceptions of their identity and affiliation to Nepal.
“We were invited by the Nepalese ruler to come and settle here,” an elderly Muslim social activist claimed. This comment is particularly interesting as it highlights the manner in which Nepali Muslims, having internalised the Indian right-wing rhetoric of ‘Muslims as invaders’ seek to distinguish themselves, carve out and justify their claim to Nepali territory and identity.
While many Nepalis experience the border as a bureaucratic entity—something to be crossed by presenting a passport or citizenship card at an official checkpoint, or through a shift in language—our interviewees in the Madhesh spoke instead of its fluidity. Many did not even consciously register when they had crossed to the other side. The border, then, is not an ever-present divide but a line that is activated primarily in moments of bureaucratic necessity—such as during elections or state-regulated transactions. Beyond rhetoric and exchange of ideologies, open/visa-free borders between India and Nepal also facilitate easy movement of people looking to instigate tensions as well as an easy access to weapons that have, in the recent years, been used to incite violence. In a conversation with a veteran journalist, he described rising communal tensions, particularly how Hindu groups justified acts of violence as “protection” against alleged Muslim attempts to disrupt religious festivities and pujas. Yet, he acknowledged that many of these so-called “attacks” were, in reality, premeditated actions by Hindus—sometimes instigated by actors from across the border—deliberately designed to provoke communal violence. This rhetoric was echoed by locals, who framed Muslims as a looming threat, implying that retaliatory violence served as a necessary deterrent against perceived aggressions.
It is important to note here that the realities are more complex than a simplistic one-way traffic of ideas and bodies from India to Nepal. As indicated at the beginning of this essay, a journalist observed and commented that given the syncretic relationship between Bihar and Madhesh, inter-religious tensions in Madhesh had the potential of inciting violence in Bihar. Thus, with Madhesh taking the lead, we see a reversal of direction in which right-wing activities shape Nepal’s place in an India-led project of Hindu nationalism.
It is essential to note that ideas of Hindu nationalism, as much as they are imported from India, do not always end up being blindly implanted in Nepal. Their dissemination and impact in Nepal need to be situated within the geo-political realities of Nepali politics and identity. Ideas are, thus, adapted to the Nepali context, aimed at addressing issues that are specific to Nepal.
The experience of border-crossing, for instance, is highly subjective. When asked how they felt after crossing into India, participants offered varied responses. One remarked that “the only difference is that population density is higher on the other side, but goods are cheaper.” Their framing of the border suggests an acute awareness of multiple, coexisting interpretations of it—operating within the constraints of the nation-state, when necessary, yet maintaining a local and cultural understanding that transcends it. Additionally, it is important to consider how our presence as interviewers may have shaped their responses, with participants consciously articulating their experiences through the lens of the nation-state, knowing that this framework would be legible to us. The responses from locals in Janakpur indicate a fluid and context-dependent relationship with the border—one that is shaped as much by historical and cultural continuity as it is by the demands of the modern state.
When asked what a Nepali Hindu state meant, we encountered a range of responses that closely mirrored the rhetoric of pro-BJP media. However, when we pressed further on what a Hindu state would look like in a distinctly Nepali context, many participants struggled to articulate a clear vision. Notably, in contrast to the discourse surrounding Hindu statehood in the hills or the capital, Madhesi participants did not reference Nepal’s historical Hindu monarchy. The demand for a Hindu state in the hills is often tied to King Mahendra’s construction of Nepal’s national identity around two core tenets: Hinduism and the monarchy. However, neither this legacy nor the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)—a political force advocating for a return to Hindu monarchy and recently involved in protests for a Hindu state—was mentioned at all. This absence underscores a fundamental reality: the Nepali state, as historically envisioned, was structured to serve a privileged minority, while the majority—particularly Madhesis—were systematically excluded and subjected to both political and racial discrimination.
For those in the Madhesh, then, the idea of a Hindu state is not primarily concerned with its national framework but rather with its localized function as a mechanism for implementing specific measures against Muslim communities, whom they perceive as a socio-political and demographic threat. This localized engagement with Hindu nationalism is not an abstract ideological commitment but rather a perceived pragmatic strategy—one that reinforces communal hierarchies and exerts control over contested social and political spaces.
Members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad marching through Janakpur. Photo courtesy of the authors.
Communal tensions in Janakpur continue to escalate, exacerbated by the intensification of Hindutva politics across the border. As the Madhesh becomes further enmeshed in the ideological currents shaping adjoining Indian states, political forces in the region will inevitably have to recalibrate their strategies in response to this shifting terrain. Thus far, explicit sectarian mobilization along religious lines has remained largely absent, with political actors limiting their engagement to calls for peace during moments of heightened violence. However, this equilibrium appears increasingly tenuous. One interviewee highlighted how tensions often surge during Indian elections, as religious polarization is strategically weaponized to consolidate electoral support on both sides of the border. This dynamic underscores the extent to which transnational political processes, particularly those driven by majoritarian nationalism, are not only reshaping local contestations in the Madhesh but also creating new pressures for political actors to align with an emergent ideological paradigm.
Despite the complex interplay of political and cultural forces competing for dominance in the Madhesh, Muslims find themselves increasingly excluded from institutional representation. One of the interviewees, a prominent Muslim leader, reflected on the shifting nature of political inclusion, contrasting the Panchayat era with the present. He noted that, during the Panchayat system, Muslims were actively appointed to government positions, a practice that, while far from equitable, at least afforded some degree of institutional recognition. However, with the consolidation of majoritarian politics, this space has effectively collapsed, as Hindu leaders no longer feel compelled to advocate for Muslim representation. The social activist himself played a pivotal role in diffusing communal tensions in recent years by leveraging his longstanding relationship with the mahant or head priest of the Janaki Mandir and organizing a meeting at the Chief District Officer’s (CDO) premises. His intervention not only illustrates the significance of interfaith relationships in managing sectarian flashpoints but also highlights the extent to which conflict resolution in the Madhesh is often relegated to informal networks rather than institutional mechanisms.
While Muslims constitute the second-largest demographic group in the Madhesh and represent a substantial voting bloc, the assertion of a distinct Muslim political identity remains fraught with tension. The social activist acknowledged this dilemma, expressing concern that any visible articulation of Muslim political agency risks being framed as a provocation—an act that could be seized upon to justify further communal polarization. This apprehension also speaks to the paradoxical role of state security forces in the region. On one hand, he emphasized that the presence of security personnel is often the only tangible safeguard preventing large-scale violence against Muslims. On the other, the history of state security forces in the Madhesh is marked by systemic repression, with law enforcement frequently deployed as an instrument for Kathmandu to assert its authority over the region. This duality raises critical questions about the extent to which state institutions function as neutral arbiters of security versus enforcers of a historically exclusionary political order.
A jeep displaying a banner of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh Nepal. Photo courtesy of the authors.
Despite the gravity of these developments, much of what is unfolding in Janakpur remains absent from broader national discourse. Conversations in Kathmandu continue to revolve around federalization and the procedural mechanics of governance, while the intensification of Hindutva politics in the Madhesh is largely overlooked. The demand for a Hindu state, though superficially similar across different regions, manifests in distinct ways depending on local political, historical, and demographic contexts. As one journalist we interviewed noted, any escalation of communal violence in Janakpur has the potential to trigger unrest not only across the Madhesh but also in India, given the deep cross-border entanglements of identity, politics, and economic life. The emergence of an explicitly Hindutva-driven political movement in the Madhesh would not only deepen existing fractures within regional politics but could also stall key development initiatives, reinforcing structural inequalities that have long defined the region’s relationship with the central state.
The entrance of a mosque located opposite the Janaki Temple. Photo courtesy of the authors.
Given these risks, there is an urgent need to recognize and engage with the ideological shifts currently taking place. The failure of the provincial government to preemptively establish mechanisms for interfaith dialogue and conflict mediation reflects a broader inability—or unwillingness—to grapple with the implications of rising religious majoritarianism. If left unaddressed, the consequences of this ideological transformation will not remain confined to the Madhesh but could fundamentally reshape Nepal’s political trajectory in ways that remain dangerously underestimated.
